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In the past time, most economies have su¤ered cyclical ‡uctuations
in their activity which may in‡uence the optimal use of productive
factors in long slow-growth phases or price stability in periods of fast
growth. This paper focuses on the possible interrelationship between
business cycles and exchange rate ‡uctuations.
We have chosen the European Monetary System framework in the
nineties, from June 1989 to December 1998, because the Peseta be-
longed to the EMS during that time. This sample is specially interest-
ing because it includes the worst crisis of the System in 1992-93 and
the following ones a¤ecting emerging countries like Mexico, Brazil or
Russia at the end of the decade. We use a Binary Dependent Variable
Logit Model to estimate the readjustment probability inside a band for
two currencies, the Peseta and the french Franc . We calculate the de-
pendent variable values from a Markov-Switching Regime Model with
constant transition probabilities. We prove that it is a suitable method
and that it allows both real and monetary variables to be identi…ed in
order to explain speculative pressures.
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11 Introduction
In the past time, most economies have su¤ered cyclical ‡uctuations
in their activity. Those events may have in‡uenced the optimal use of
productive factors in long slow-growth phases or price stability over long
periods of time.
A better understanding of the interactions between the economic policies
and business cycles has been and still is one of the main questions in
macroeconomic theory. A good example of this is the favorable experience
of some countries in the nineties, with respect to the …xing of objectives
for in‡ation. This has contributed to a relative stability in prices and has
helped to reduce the risk of sharp ‡uctuations in the future.
This paper focuses on the relationship between business cycles and
exchange rate ‡uctuations. Empirical evidence seems to con…rm the
hypothesis of a relationship between exchange rate ‡uctuations and
international di¤erences in economic activity. That is, an appreciation trend
in exchange rates corresponds to fast growth phases and a depreciation,
to recessions. The recent experience of The United States or The United
Kingdom strengthens our hypothesis because both the strong Dollar and
the strong Pound, as compared to the Japanese Yen or the Deutsche Mark,
corresponds to fast economic growth phases in the former and a decline in
the latter countries.
The Uncovered Interest Parity condition can be a useful tool to show
the link between exchange rates and business cycles. Economic growth
could provoke, through an increase in the demand for money, an increase
in the interest rates di¤erential and, therefore, the appreciation of the
domestic currency. The strengthening of the currency will be su¢cient for
the depreciation expectations of the exchange rate to be equal to the interest
rates di¤erential [when the risk premium is very small, or even zero].
2However, it is not always possible to …nd a positive relationship between
interest rate di¤erentials and exchange rates. For instance, if the monetary
policy tries to maintain an exchange rate objective, a real or foreseen
appreciation of the national currency can provoke a decrease in the national
interest rate and a smaller interest rate di¤erential, at least in the short run1.
This question may have in‡uenced the discouraging results of econometric
studies which tried to establish a relationship between exchange rates and
business cycles or other macroeconomic variables.
This study tries to show some evidence with respect to that issue by
using the Uncovered Interest Parity and then the interest rate di¤erentials
as a “proxy” variable of the readjustment probability. We have chosen the
European Monetary System framework in the nineties, from June 1989 to
December 1998, because the Peseta belonged to the EMS during that time.
This sample is specially interesting because it includes the worst crisis of
the System, in 1992-93, and the following ones a¤ecting emerging countries
such as, Mexico, Brazil or Russia at the end of the decade.
Those currency crises, above all those a¤ecting the European countries,
have demonstrated that turbulences can occur in economies with supposedly
healthy macroeconomic policies. It is possible that the decision to leave
parity was not based on the depletion of reserves, so much as on the
governments´reluctance to maintain high interest rates that were unsuitable
for maintaining domestic stability. A government can follow multiple
objectives, so it may have to choose between the maintenance of a …xed
exchange rate and the control of unemployment or economic growth.
Our purpose is to investigate the reasons underlying devaluations or
speculative pressures in countries which su¤ered the ERM crisis. Besides,
as we shall show later, the results of the crisis were di¤erent depending on
the country. For instance, Spain readjusted the central parity four times,
1In February 1987, after the Louvre Intervention Accord, which tried to stabilize the
Dollar exchange rate, its relationship with the interest rate di¤erential was the opposite.
3while France kept the parity over the entire sample period. Nevertheless,
both countries had similar readjustment probability values and it is possible
to identify almost the same real and monetary variables as being responsible
for the crisis.
This paper is divided as follows. Section 1 presents a simpli…ed version of
the Obstfeld model [Obstfeld (1994)] with an optimizing government. This
theoretical model will be used as the basis of our empirical results, shown
in section four. Previously, in section three, the behaviour of the exchange
rate in each selected country will be describe. The estimation in the fourth
section applies a Binary Dependent Variable Logit Model. We calculate
the dependent variable values from a Markov-Switching Regime Model with
constant transition probabilities. Our conclusions, in Section 5, underline
the most outstanding results. Finally, in the Appendix to this paper, the
simplest Hamilton´s model is presented.
2 A Model with Nonlinearities in Government
Behaviour
In general, the basic feature of a currency crisis is the collapse of the
exchange rate system. A special part of the economic literature has been
concerned with the reasons and determinants of that kind of event2.T h e
earlier works about Balance-of-Payments crises [“…rst generation models”]
focused on the inconsistency between macroeconomic policies and the
maintenance of a …xed exchange parity. If the monetary authority runs
overly expansive domestic policies, these measures could lead the economy
into a crisis. If private agents consider that the level of international reserves
is large enough, then the situation could be maintained for a long time. But
if the reserves decrease, the exchange rate parity becomes unsustainable.
These models appeared to explain the crises su¤ered by some developing
2For a survey of currency crises literature, see Blackburn and Sola (1993), Jeanne
(1997) and Flood and Marion (1998).
4countries like Mexico (1973-1982) and Argentina (1978-1981)3.
Obstfeld´s paper “The Logic of Currency Crises” is considered as a
very advanced work in currency crisis studies. It introduces nonlinearity in
government behaviour. Let us suppose that the government conduct can be









where L represents the social loss function; ± i st h er a t eo fc u r r e n c y
depreciation; E± is the expected rate of currency depreciation; " is a
disturbance with zero mean and variance ¾2; · is a measure of distortion with
respect to the disturbance, " and µ is the relative weight attached to price
changes. All the variables are in the same period except the expectation
operator, which is based on the past values of the variables.
This function re‡ects the attempt to minimize either both real price
changes, due to reasons of credibility or reputation […rst part of the equation
(2:1)], and unexpected price changes [second part of the equation (2:1)]; or
only the unexpected price changes in order to stabilize unemployment or the
business cycle [second part only].
Let us compare the costs and bene…ts of di¤erent actions by authorities:
1.- The exchange rate will be …xed [± =0 ] and private agents have
predetermined expectations E± =0 . The expected value of the social
loss function when the government follows the rule […xed exchange





2.- The government will act bearing in mind the predetermined private
expectations while also considering the possibility of modifying
3Seminal papers of …rst-generation models are Salant and Henderson (1978) and
Krugman (1979).
5exchange rate parity [discretion]. We suppose private agents assume
this policy and then E±2 = ·






with µ =1 .
Let us suppose that there are two possible states in the economy
depending on the existence or not of the shocks ".W e c o m p a r e c o s t s a n d
bene…ts of policymaking …rst for the rule and then for discretion [modifying
the exchange rate parity].




<E L (2) = ·2
But if there are shocks, ¾2 > 0. In this case, the result will depend on
the value of ¾2 value with respect to ·.S u p p o s i n g¾2 is large enough with
respect to ·, then discretion or the possibility of leaving the exchange rate
regime is better than the rule [maintaining the …xed exchange rate].
In general, it is considered that government should pursue a mixed
strategy, that is, …x the exchange rate but with the possibility of “escape”
when the disturbances become especially disruptive. Obviously, this option
of invoking the escape clause is a costly action, because otherwise, discretion
w o u l da l w a y sb et h eb e s to p t i o n . W i t ha ne s c a p ec l a u s e ,t h eg o v e r n m e n t
follows the rule whenever L(1) <L (2) + C where C is the cost for the
government when it chooses the possibility of devaluing the currency [escape
clause].
It is necessary to know the value of the disturbance, ¹ ", which is able
to trigger the crisis and therefore, the devaluation. It can be expressed as
follows:
L(1) (¹ ") >L (2) (¹ ")+C (2.4)
6This is a nonlinear relationship because of private agents, who form
their expectations about the rate of currency depreciation. They set their
expectations by calculating a probability weighted average of the expected
rate of depreciation under the rule and under discretion at the beginning of
the period, when they do not know the policy of the government.
Figure 1 represents this nonlinear problem.4 The curved line plots
L(1)¡L(2), the horizontal lines represent arbitrary levels of C and the vertical
ones show di¤erent shock values of ". There are two intersections, E0 and
E1. One of them corresponds to a small disturbance "0 and the other to a
larger value, "1.












Figure 1: Possibility of Multiple Equilibria
For a given cost C, if private agents believe that the government
will abandon the …xed exchange rate when the disturbance is "1,t h e n
4See Obstfeld (1994) to know the speci…c functional forms. The simulation has been
obtained by using the same parameter values as the author assigns in his paper.
7government should adopt that value in order to solve its optimization
problem. It will be the value at which the escape clause will be adopted,
this means it is the shock value that triggers the devaluation. Similarly, if
agents adopt "0, this will be the best strategy for the government. Thus,
the possibility of multiple equilibria through nonlinearities in government
behaviour depending on predetermined private expectations about the
current state of the economy is proved.
When there is the possibility of switching from one equilibrium to
another and the cost of abandoning the …xed exchange rate increases, for
example, up to C1, a crisis becomes more possible if the disturbance value,
which triggers the escape clause, decreases 5.[ E3 in …gure 1]
The value of C may be considered as the government´s commitment
with the …xed exchange rate. For instance, the members of the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism [ERM] had a tight commitment with the …xed
exchange rate arrangement before the crisis in 1992. The Maastricht Treaty
forced European countries to stay in the EMS for at least two years without
realignments. In practice this meant it was impossible to invoke the escape
clause. It is, thus possible to justify that countries without important
economic imbalances are in a crisis zone.
However, this does not mean that currency crises have no relationship to
economic variables, but that the commitment to …xed rate expectations may
depend on more than the available international reserves to defend the parity
[as First generation models predict]. Those expectations could also depend
on the government´s will to achieve stability or control of the fundamental
variables. As shall be, it is possible that a government could face a very
di¢cult situation should it try to keep interest rates high to defend parity
when the economy is in a slow growth phase.
5Flood and Marion (1997).
83 A n a l y s i so fE v e n t sa n dR e l e v a n tD a t e s
Figures 2 and 3 plot the evolution of the Peseta/Deutsche mark
exchange rate and French franc/Deutsche mark exchange rate in the sample
period, from June 1989 to December 1998. We also showed in the …gures
the central parities and the limits of the bands for both currencies, §2:25%
for the French franc and §6% for the Spanish case, throughout the sample,
[corresponding to what we have called the “soft band”]6 as well as the actual
limits of §2:25% and §6%, respectively, besides §15% from August 1992.
Empirical evidence justi…es the hypothesis of taking into account the “soft
bands” because European o¢cials continued to con…ne the ERM exchange
rates within narrower margins and only usually intervening when the rates
hovered around their former intervention limits, except in the short run
[under strong market pressure].7
The most obvious di¤erence that can be seen between both …gures is
that the evolution of the parity is quite di¤erent. In the case of France,
the central parity does not change during the sample, whereas the central
parity in Spain changes four times with the devaluations [17 September
1992, 23 November 1992, 14 May 1993, and the last one,6 March 1995].
This di¤erence could lead us to believe that there are di¤erent exchange
rate behaviours between the currencies. However, as we shall suggest later,
both currencies su¤ered high readjustment probabilities in spite of the fact
that the …nal result was not the same.
In the narrow band period, §6% in the Spanish case, an initial phase can
be detected from the time of joining the ERM of the European Monetary
System until June 1992. During that time, the Peseta was overvalued and
it was grazing the lower band and provoking di¢culties for other currencies,
6Bartolini and Prati (1997, 1999) considered the possibility of setting a “soft target
zone”.



























Figure 3: Monthly Franc/Mark Exchange Rate [June 1989-December 1998]
10e.g. the French franc8. This period brought to light the divergences in
business cycles among the european economies, as well as the policymaking
dilemmas that stemmed from these divergences. This tensions led to the
monetary storm of 1992, when the Peseta was devalued three times.
The French franc also su¤ered strong speculative pressures which were
successfully stopped by the coordinated intervention e¤orts of Germany and
France. At the end of June, a new wave of attacks focused on the French
franc and the monetary authorities had to intervene to stop the massive
speculation against the currency. Those events led the Economy and Finance
Ministers and the Central Banks Chairs to decide the shifts in band widths
to §15% for all the currencies, except the German mark and the Dutch
guilder.
After the shifts in band widths, the Spanish currency showed a relative
trend to depreciation that became more intense in 1995. The Mexican peso
crisis at the end of December 1994 provoked contagious e¤ects in other
countries with close trade links. The US dollar appreciated in value and it
caused the mark to strengthen and the rest of the EMS currencies to weaken.
The Spanish currency depreciated in value and the risk premium increased
due not only to the problems of the dollar, but also because of the political
uncertainty in Spain at that moment and the bad evolution that in‡ation
and the budget de…cit were showing. At the beginning of March 1995, the
pressures on the Peseta increased and this resulted in the monetary authority
approving a devaluation. The Peseta su¤ered from another readjustment of
7% on 6th March. That devaluation was qualitatively di¤erent to the three
previous ones because it happened before the Peseta exchange rate reached
the upper band.9 However, ERM exchange rates never came close to their
8The French franc passed the upper band in December 1990 and it was grazing this
limit during March, April and May in 1991.
9This realignment was therefore labelled as a “technical devaluation” because the
evolution of the fundamental variables of the economy did not make it necessary, yet
it was necessary to stop the exchange rate from reaching the upper band. [See Spanish
Central Bank Annual Report, 1995, p. 46]
11new limits after August 1993. As mentioned above, European central banks
continued to con…ne exchange rates within narrower margins.
Looking at the …gures, it is possible to see that if we consider the narrow
bands, both currencies were grazing their upper bands at di¤erent moments
throughout 1994. Even more, they passed the “soft bands” on occasions
[from December 1994 to April 1995 in the Spanish case, and from November
1994 to August 1995 in the French franc case]. The decision to devaluate the
Peseta in 1995 seems to have seen completely justi…ed due to the problems
it was having.
T h ee v o l u t i o no ft h eP e s e t ae x c h a n g er a t ei nt h ef o l l o w i n gm o n t h s
endorsed this action and the markets corrected the excessive depreciation
prior to the devaluation. Our period of study concludes with a last phase
of relative stability that was in‡uenced by a strong dollar and, above all,
by the convergence in fundamental variables of those economies which had
expectations of joining the future European Monetary Union10.
4 Binary Dependent Variable Model
4.1 Econometric Speci…cation
As we said before, this paper tries to …nd whether there is some relation
between realignments or exchange rates depreciations and macroeconomic
variables. In this section, we shall estimate the readjustment probability
o ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ei nat a r g e tz o n er e g i m e 11 using a binary dependent
variable model with a logistic distribution. We have to specify the moments
in which the dependent variable will assume only two values f1;0g.L e tjt
be our dependent variable and jt =1if there is a lack of credibility and then
10The evolution of long and short term interest rates was a clear indication of the
convergence process.
11Our readjustment idea not only refers to realignments or devaluations, but also it
considers any exchange rate jump inside the band [depreciation] [Vid. Bekaert y Gray
(1998)]
12a high probability of readjustment [storm period], and jt =0if it is a calm
period with high credibility.
The logistic distribution function we shall use, F ({;°), is the following:
Prob(jt =1 )=F ({;°)=
exp[°{]
1+e x p[ °{]
(4.1)
where Prob(jt =0 ) = 1¡ Prob(jt =1 ) ,a n d{ is a vector of observed
exogenous variables that we will use in the analysis, ° being the parameter
vector.
We use a Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method and the numerical
optimization is reached through the iterative algorithm known as “Newton-







(1 ¡ jt)l n [ 1 ¡ F ({;°)] (4.2)
4.2 Selection of Exogenous Variables
To specify the exogenous variables, we have considered the following points
of view:
1.- Throughout the sample, there were di¤erent speculative pressures
episodes. Therefore, we consider monetary variables …rst. If these
variables are signi…cant they will ratify the conclusions of the …rst-
generation models. On other hand, we shall also use real variables
which, if relevant, can justify the support given to second-generation
models, [in our case, discretion or “escape clause”]. If none of them are
signi…cant, we would qualify the pressures as “self-ful…lling” attacks.
2.- Both currencies [Peseta and French franc] belonged to the ERM of the
European Monetary System and we shall therefore stress that fact by
introducing some variables related to the existence of the target zone
or even a “Soft Target Zone”.
13As monetary variables, we have used in both cases [France and Spain]:
international reserves and the variation in international reserves, the
monetary aggregate rate of growth and the di¤erential of the monetary
aggregate rates of growth between the country and Germany, the in‡ation
rate, the in‡ation rate di¤erential between the analyzed country and
Germany and the Purchasing Power of Parity.
O ft h ep o s s i b l er e a lv a r i a b l e s ,w eh a v es t u d i e dt h er e l e v a n c eo ft h e
domestic industrial production index and the index di¤erential with respect
to Germany, the domestic current account balance, the real exchange rate
and the unemployment rate.
Finally, as target zone variables, we have included the domestic exchange
rates against the Deutsche Mark and the US Dollar, the exchange rate
deviations from the central parity, exchange rate deviations from the upper
band and exchange rate deviations from the upper soft band.
We have used monthly data for all the variables from June 1989 to
December 1998. Most of the series come from the OECD, “Main Economic
Indicators”.
4.3 Dependent Variable Estimation
A tt h ec u r r e n ts t a g eo fo u rw o r k ,w eh a v et os p e c i f yt h em o m e n t si n
which the dependent variable assume only two values, 1 or 0. We use the
Markov-Switching regime econometric procedure because this method allows
us to identify jumps in the variable which either resulted in central parity
changes or in exchange rate appreciations or depreciations inside the bands.
The purpose is thus to separate the nominal interest rate di¤erential
between Spain and Germany and between France and Germany into two
possible states of the economy, calm and storm. This is the variable used as
a “proxy” of the expected devaluation in each country. One of the regimes
14will be associated to a high mean and a high variance [turbulence state],
and the other to small parameters values [calm state].
Let us call mt the unobserved random variable which indicates the state
of the economy at t. We suppose it follows a Markov chain with only two
possible states, mt =0in the calm state without disturbances, and mt =1
in the crisis state.
Table 1 shows the results of the estimation. We have considered the
possibility of both the mean and the variance changing with the state. The
autorregressive speci…cation used for the nominal interest rate di¤erentials
between Spain and Germany is AR (4), whereas in the french case we used
the autorregressive speci…cation AR(2). The Markov-Switching model is
described in the appendix of this paper. All the estimated parameters are
signi…cant as the asymptotic standard errors indicate. Figures 6 and 7 in
the appendix show the estimation results and the evolution of the nominal
interest rate di¤erentials for both Spain and France.
We should specify the criterion to be used in order to choose the
dependent variable values for the Logit Model. That criterion will depend
on the con…dence percentage the economic agents assign to the readjustment
expectations. We build a §1:65 standard deviation threshold.12 We shall
assign the dependent variable value jt =1[crisis or high realignment
probability] whether the threshold is above or below zero. Otherwise, we
will consider jt =0 .
4.4 Estimation Results
We have estimated the Log Likelihood function expressed in equation
(4:2) using the selected exogenous variables.
12As in Lindberg, Svensson and Söderlind (1993) [13, pp. 1175] we construct a 95 per
cent con…dence interval of the estimated rate of devaluation; In our case, it comes from
the …ltered serie using the Hamilton´s procedure.







































Log Likelihood 48:5462 105:8699
P00 0:9574 0:8971
P11 0:8056 0:7614
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are tabulated in parentheses.
16The results in table 2 correspond to models which have passed the
validation phase in each country case.13 The omitted variables test enables
us to evaluate the set of signi…cant variables to explain the variation in the
dependent variable. The only signi…cant signi…cant variables we obtained
were: the industrial production index in both countries, yt,t h ei n d u s t r i a l
production index di¤erentials, (yt ¡ y¤
t) and the Purchasing Power of Parity
[PPP], in Spain and France. In the Spanish case, international reserves
were also signi…cant. Finally, the exchange rate deviations from the upper
band and the upper soft band only have signi…cance in France or Spain,
respectively
The LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope coe¢cients
except the constant are zero in order to test the overall signi…cance of the
model14. Our LR statistics value rejects this possibility. We considered it
of interest to include a (2x2 ) table of correct and incorrect classi…cation
based on a user speci…ed prediction rule. Observations have been classi…ed
as having predicted probabilities that are above or below the cuto¤ value of
0.3.15 Table 3 provides a measure of the predictive ability of our models.
The estimated model correctly predicts more than 90% for the Spanish case
and almost 80% for France.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the readjustment probability throughout our
sample. It is possible to …nd similar unstable moments in both cases. It
is important to point out that the Peseta su¤ered four devaluations and
the French franc did not change the central parity at all. That question
con…rms the high readjustment probability under speculative pressures in
both countries in spite of their having di¤erent consequences.
13We have carried out the ML test for heteroskedasticity [see table 2] and we could not
reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
14Greene (1998) [7, pp. 766]
15We have used a cuto¤ value of 0.3 instead of 0.5 because our dependent variables (jt)
present many more values of calm (jt =0 )than values of crisis (jt =1 ) .






































Note: The value in parentheses in the estimated parameters is the z statistic;
this statistic has a standard normal distribution. The superscript ¤ shows that the
corresponding parameter value is signi…cant at 1 per cent. The value in
parentheses in both the LR statistic and the ML test for heteroskedasticity is the
p-value. The AIC is the Akaike info Criterion.
Table 3: Prediction Evaluation using a Logit Binary Model
Spain France
jt =0 jt =1 Total jt =0 jt =1 Total
p(jt =1 )· 0:3 85 1 86 68 6 74
p(jt =1 )> 0:3 9 19 28 18 20 38
Total 94 20 114 86 26 112
% Correct 90.43 95.00 91.23 79.07 76.92 78.57
Note: Correct classi…cations are obtained when the predicted probability is
greater than 0:3 and the observed jt =1 , or when the predicted probability is















90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Readjustment Probability (Fr)
Even more, we could suggest that the Peseta enjoyed many more periods
of calm than did the French franc. The readjustment probability of the
franc is higher than the Peseta at two moments: …rst, during the monetary
storm 1992-93, when the French franc detects certain instability before the
Peseta, which is probably due to the result in the Danish referendum to ratify
19the Maastricht Treaty [June 1992] and the possibility of the same negative
result in France [foreseen for September]; secondly, during 95-96, a time in
w h i c ht h eP e s e t aw a sd e v a l u e da g a i na n dt h eF r e n c hf r a n cw a so u t s i d ei t s
hypothetical soft band [Figure 3]. This is a con…rmation of Bartolini &
Prati´s theory [1997, 1999] concerning intervention in the short run to avoid
speculative attacks.
It is important to stress the results obtained concerning the signi…cant
variables. We have shown that some of the variables belonging to the three
types [monetary, real and target zone] are relevant when we try to explain
speculative pressure processes su¤ered by the analyzed currencies. This
question is analyzed in greater detail as the conclusions of the paper.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The aim of this paper was to looking for evidence of the relationship
between business cycles and exchange rate ‡uctuations. The nineties
o¤ered some examples of currency crises, both in industrial and developing
countries. In spite of only having chosen the EMS framework, we have
focused on two currencies which are examples of di¤erent results in the
presence of speculative pressures. Thus, taking the Peseta, we consider
attacks which have resulted in devaluations while taking into account the
French franc, we try to show pressures which do not imply realignments. For
that reason, it was necessary to consider two sorts of studies, those belonging
to “Target Zone” literature and those belonging to “Currency Crises”.
If intuition suggests that there is a link between exchange rates and
business cycles, a second generation model supplies the theory to justify
it. Our results seem to illustrate that question by proving that in both
cases, the industrial production indexes and the di¤erentials with respect to
Germany are signi…cant variables [as well as, the PPP, international reserves
and exchange rate deviations from the upper band and the upper soft band,
20all of them being, traditional results in this kind of analysis]. Thus we can
indicate a set of traditional economic fundamentals and others, linked with
business cycles, as variables to be taken into account in order to explain
exchange rate turbulences.
Empirical evidence has shown the expectations about the rate of
depreciation depend on more than just international reserves, as the …rst
currency models predicted. In this sense, if private agents believe that the
government may be worried about the evolution of unemployment or the
growth rate of the economy, then there could be expectations of depreciation
because there is a cost to maintaining parity through high interest rates
which damage the growth rate16.
De…nitively, we can suggest a non-structural binary dependent variable
model as an appropiate method to adequately explain the exchange rate
turbulence and the relationship with business cycle.
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226 Appendix: Markov-Switching Regime Model
(Constant Transition Probabilities)
We have used the known Hamilton’s Model to choose the values of the
dependent variable of the logit model. Hamilton’s model (1989, 1990) allows
a variable to follow di¤erent time series processes depending on the sample
considered. We try to separate two possible states or regimes of the economy.
One of them is associated to high variance, the crisis state, and the other will
be the calm state. Our state variable is a non-observed mt random variable
which follows a discrete time two state Markov chain, therefore the change
or jump in the state is also a random variable. If mt =0 , then the process
is in calm regime without shocks or disturbances. In contrast, if mt =1the
process is in crisis regime or storm state.
It is possible to model the dynamic of the nominal interest rate
di¤erential between Spain and Germany and between France and Germany,
using an autorregressive speci…cation AR (4) or AR(2) respectively. We let
mean and variance vary with the state. It is given by:




+ ¾mtºt t =1 :::T (A.1)
where yt represents the interest rate di¤erentials, ºt are independent and
identically distributed random variables with zero mean and unit variance
Ã N(0;1). We can parametrize linearly mean and standard deviation shift
f u n c t i o n sa sf o l l o w s :
* ¹mt = ®0 + ®1mt
¾mt = ¾0(1 ¡ mt)+¾1mt
As the economy can only be in one of two possible states, it is supposed
that the probability of being in one of them depends solely on the state it
was in on the previous date, (t ¡ 1),t h u s :
P fmt = i j mt¡1 = j;mt¡2 = k;:::g = P fmt = i j mt¡1 = jg = pij (A.2)
This equation describes a Markov chain with two states and pij=0 ;1






where, (1 ¡ p00)=p01,a n d(1 ¡ p11)=p10.
6.0.1 Econometric Speci…cation and Optimal Inference
Let yt be a (T ¡ 1) vector of monthly interest rate di¤erential between
Spain and Germany or France and Germany. If the process at t is governed
by the state mt = j, the conditional density function of yt is given by:
f (yt j mt; ­t¡1; ®) (A.3)
where ­t =( ­t;­t¡1;:::;­1) is the information vector through date t,
and ®
¡




is a vector of parameters characterizing the
conditional density function18. With two regimes the densities represented





f (yt j mt =0 ;y t¡1; ®)= 1 p
2¼¾ 0 exp
n




f (yt j mt =1 ;y t¡1; ®)= 1 p
2¼¾ 1 exp
n





We could de…ne a new vector ª with all the parameters. We shall
estimate ª
¡




, conditioned to the information
through t.
Even assuming ª is known, we still do not know the regime the process
is at on every date in our sample and if it belongs to calm or crisis. We form
17We assume the Markov chain is irreducible so 0 <p 00, p11 < 1. If one of the transition
probabilities is 1, then the P matrix is triangular. Then, once the process enters that state,
there is no possibility of ever returning to the other state. [10, Hamilton, 1994, ch. 22, p.
680] and [1, Avesani and Gallo, 1996, p. 12]
18Á is a vector of autorregressive parameters. We have Á1,, Á2, Á3, Á4 for Spain and Á1,
Á2 for France
24a probabilistic inference about the unobserved regime depending on all the
observations available:
P fmt = i j ­t;ª g i =0 ;1 (A.5)
We could collect in a (2 £ 1) vector, denoted ^ », these conditional
probabilities that the analysis assigns to the possibility that the tth
observation is generated by regime i. The optimal inference for each date t
can be found by iterating the equation:
^ »t=t =
³




^ »tjt¡1 Ä ´t
´ (A.6)
where 1 represents a (2 £ 1) vector of 1s,a n dÄ denotes element-by-element
multiplication.
The log likelihood function L(ª) for the observed data evaluated at the
value of ª that is used to perform the iterations can be calculated as a




log f (yt j ­t¡1;ª ) (A.7)
and where:
f (yt j ­t¡1;ª ) = 1 0
³
^ »tjt¡1 Ä ´t
´
(A.8)
6.0.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters
If we iterate equation (A:6), and it is completed for all the dates in the
sample, then it is possible to …nd the log likelihood value through (A:7).T h e
values of the parameters in ª, which maximizes the log likelihood function, is
obtained by numerical optimization using, in our case, the Newton-Raphson
algorithm.19
The following …gures 6 and 7 show the estimation results and the
evolution of the nominal interest rate di¤erentials for both Spain and France.
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